EXPANDING THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
BESTIARY: DOES CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
SATISFY THE FAMILY RESEMBLANCE TEST?
Alan M. Weinberger*

INTRODUCrION

If Able and Baker own Blackacre in equal shares as tenants in
common, Baker has the right to occupy the entire Blackacre without any obligation to pay rent to Able.' If, during the course of his
occupancy, Baker happened to discover gold in the subsurface
rock formation and thereafter mined the gold, Baker would be obligated to pay Able half the profit Baker realized from the sale of
the gold.2 Similarly, Baker would be obligated to pay Able half the
net income Baker receives from licensing a third party to mine the
gold.'
Accordingly, it might occur to Baker that his industry and
good fortune would better be rewarded by first acquiring Able's
half interest in Blackacre, and thereafter mining the gold himself
or licensing a third party to mine the gold. Conscience and honor
will inform Baker's decision whether to disclose his knowledge to
Able or to respond expansively if asked by Able, "So, Baker, tell me:
have you discovered oil on Blackacre yet?"
When Able and Baker initially acquired Blackacre, they probably obtained mortgage financing for most of the purchase price. If
problems thereafter arise in connection with their plans for the
property, Able may seek out new investors. With their help, Able
may be able to acquire Blackacre upon a foreclosure sale of the
property without notifying Baker, or offering him an opportunity
to participate in the restructuring arrangements, or restoring
Baker's title to an undivided half interest in Blackacre upon
Baker's reimbursement of half of Able's expenditures.4
Whether these scenarios present legal, as well as moral and
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ethical problems for Baker, depends upon whether Baker owes fiduciary duties to Able and, if so, the scope of his fiduciary relationship with Able. By now it would seem that there should be
definitive answers to these problems from a legal perspective, but
5
there are not.
Concurrent ownership as a fiduciary relationship poses a challenge to legal taxonomy.6 It is unlikely to appear among numerous
conventional relationships commonly regarded as attracting fiduci24 (1981).
In some respects, the attempt to categorize fiduciary relationships is reminiscent
of the medieval bestiary, a pseudoscientific compendium of the animal kingdom,
complete with moralistic parables, religious allegory, and pious reflection. See, e.g., T.
J. ELLIOTT, A MEDIEVAL BESTIARY (1971). A homiletic flavor characterizes the discourse on the law of fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949); see also M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S.
685, 691 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924) (suggesting that fiduciary law seeks "to harmonize the
necessities of a competitive industrial system of business with the teachings of morality"); DEBORAH A. DEMOTr, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 11
(1991) (opining that 'judicial opinions interpreting and applying fiduciary norms
sound at times like sermons"); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 82932 (1983) (noting the moral theme in fiduciary law); Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender
as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 21-22 (1992) (footnote omitted) ("[F]iduciary law supplies a moral (not to say moralistic) dimension to the body
of law that regulates economic activity.").
A leading contemporary scholar in the field of fiduciary relationships argues that
fiduciary duty is itself a challenge to legal taxonomy, i.e., the process of classifying
particular types of things into general categories constructed with some purpose or
system in mind, in that this duty defies easy classification within larger systems of law,
such as contract or tort. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation Under Intellectual
Siege: Contemporary Challenges to the Duty to be Loyal, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471 (1992)
[hereinafter Contemporary Challenges]. Elsewhere, Professor DeMott is an articulate
critic of the tendency of courts to substitute rhetoric for analysis in decisions involving
fiduciary obligation. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 [hereinafter Beyond Metaphor]. Here, however,
she inadvertently demonstrates the difficulty of writing about the law of fiduciary duty
without lapsing into overstatement: "Whether a particular type of event constitutes a
tort as opposed to a contract matters greatly: among other consequences, remedies
and limitations periods are apt to differ depending on how the event is classified. In
biology, in contrast, taxonomic decisions matter, but fewer practical consequences
turn on them." DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra, at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
Although it is true that the consequences of a lapsed statute of limitations are customarily characterized in some circles as "fatal," see, e.g., Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S.
21, 30 (1986); Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065, 1071 (Ala. 1982), how that
compares in importance with the practical consequences that "turn" on the proper
classification of mushrooms, ivy, and snakes probably depends upon how much time
one spends outside of the law library and courthouse. Indeed, even within a strictly
legal frame of reference, biological taxonomy can be outcome determinative. See, e.g.,
Laglia v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 894, 895, 900 (1987) (stating that because the bean
produced by the jojoba plant is a seed, rather than a nut or fruit, taxpayers properly
deducted expenses in connection with jojoba plantation, notwithstanding an Internal
Revenue Code provision requiring the capitalization of expenditures incurred in
planting fruits or nuts). Ultimately, Professor DeMott concludes that taxonomic anal5 J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES
6
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ary obligation. 7 Some commentators expressly deny that common
law tenancy in common properly belongs among the fiduciary relationships.' Most commentators, however, are equivocal9 and
euphemistic.10
Holdings relying on the premise that tenants in common occupy a fiduciary relationship may be found in most U.S. jurisdic12
tions. 1 These opinions are too heavy on rhetorical hyperbole
ysis is inadequate in the evaluation of fiduciary norms. DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra, at 497.
7 A non-exhaustive list of these relationships would include: "Trustees, corporate
directors, agents, guardians, attorneys, partners, commercial lenders, marriage counsellors and spies . . .." DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 6, at 472. The
word "spies" is presumably a reference to former CIA agent Frank Snepp, who published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without submitting it to the
Agency for prepublication review. Finding Snepp in violation of his fiduciary obligation to the Agency, the Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on his royalties
from book sales. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Cf GEORGE T.
BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 93 (1874) (identifying the tenancy in common as
being among the relationships giving rise to fiduciary duty, and apparently describing
the limited situation where a cotenant's acquisition of an outstanding title inures to
the benefit of his cotenants). See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., William G. Hart, The Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford, 21 LAW
Q. REv. 258, 261-62 (1905).
9 See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.03[1][b] (A.James Casner ed. 1952);
OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 309 (5th ed. 1989). Another commentator noted:
One of the legal consequences that ensues from the existence of a cotenancy, whether ajoint tenancy, a tenancy in common, or a tenancy by
the entireties is the existence of a fiduciary relationship of a certain nature between the cotenants .... Other cases, however, hold to the rule
that the mere fact that persons are tenants in common does not give
rise to a fiduciary relationship. A relation of mutual trust and confidence does not exist, as a matter of law, between tenants in common,
not in joint possession, who came into their cotenancy by different conveyances, at different times ....
4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1801 (1979).
10 For example, William E. Burby pointed out that
[t]echnically, neither a fiduciary nor a confidential relationship arises
out of the concurrent ownership of property.... But even in the absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, it does not follow that
there is not a 'guide of conduct' that regulates transactions by and between cotenants that relates to ownership of the property.
WILLIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99 (3d ed. 1965).
11 Foster v. Hudson, 437 So. 2d 528, 529-30 (Ala. 1983); Stoltz v. Maloney, 630 P.2d
560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (dicta); Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823
S.W.2d 903, 906 (Ark. 1992); Aaron v. Puccinelli, 264 P.2d 152, 154 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953);Jennings v. Bradfield, 454 P.2d 81, 82 (Colo. 1969) (en banc) (dicta); McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp. 1548, 1562 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (dicta) (applying
Georgia law); Fuller v. McBurrows, 192 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. 1972); City of Honolulu
v. Bennett, 552 P.2d 1380, 1390 (Haw. 1976); Givens v. Givens, 387 S.W.2d 851, 853
(Ky. Ct. App. 1965) (dicta); Salter v. Quinn, 134 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Mass. 1956); Hoverson v. Hoverson, 12 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Minn. 1943); Kennedy v. Bryant, 252 So. 2d
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and metaphor,1 3 however, and too light on analysis and rationale 4
to justify any attempt to distill some central thrust or judicial
intent.
Upon close analysis, it is probably a fair interpretation of decided cases to say that most courts have long recognized concurrent ownership of property as something of a near or limited
784, 788 (Miss. 1971); Quates v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 803, 809 (Miss. 1970); Gilliam v.
Gohn, 303 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. 1957) (dicta); White v. Roberts, 637 S.W.2d 332, 334
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Colby v. Colby, 79 A.2d 343, 344-45 (N.H. 1951) (dicta); Colquhoun v. Colquhoun, 88 N.J. 558, 563, 443 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1982); Smith v. Borradaile,
227 P. 602, 607-08 (N.M. 1922); Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 575 (N.Y.
1989); Minion v. Warner, 144 N.E. 665, 666 (N.Y. 1924); Van Home v. Fonda, 5
Johns. Ch. 388, 406-07 (N.Y. Ch. 1821); Goergen v. Maar, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826, 831 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1956); Dolan v. Cummings, 102 N.Y.S. 91, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907) (Gaynor,
J., concurring); Rider v. Phillips, 178 N.Y.S. 142, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919); Bailey v.
Howell, 184 S.E. 476, 478 (N.C. 1936); Bartz v. Heringer, 322 N.W.2d 243, 244 (N.D.
1982); Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Okla. 1988); Kennedy v. Rinehart, 574 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Or. 1978); Lund v. Heinrich, 189 A.2d 581,
583 (Pa. 1963) (dicta); Beers v. Pusey, 132 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1957); Duff v. Wilson, 72
Pa. 442, 447-48 (1872); Rebelo v. Cardoso, 161 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I. 1960); Mountcastle
v. Baird, 1988 WL 5682, 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (dicta); Watson v. United Am. Bank,
588 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (dicta); Cecil v. Dollar, 218 S.W.2d 448,
450 (Tex. 1949); Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.2d 139, 141 (Utah 1983); United States v.
Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying Washington law); Cummings
v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); Preston v. United States,
696 F.2d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 709 F.2d 488 (1983) (applying Wisconsin law).
For courts reaching a different conclusion, see Streeter v. Shultz, 52 N.Y. Sup. Ct.
406, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1887); In re Freeman, 101 B.R. 698, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Scott v. Scruggs, 836 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992); Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Hamman v. Ritchie, 547 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980).
In Louisiana, the civil law analogue to the common law tenancy in common is
ownership in indivision. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 797-822 (West 1992). Co-owners in
indivision do not have a fiduciary relationship. Jeanne M. Gravois, Comment, The
Revision of the Louisiana Co-Ownership Law, 65 TUL. L. Rv. 1261, 1271 (1991).
12 DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 6, at 472. One commentator believes that the excessive rhetorical force used in promulgating fiduciary doctrine is a
necessary control mechanism that results from the imprecision of the standard. J. A.
C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities,
22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 11 (1987) ("Ambiguity breeds vehemence.").
13 For example, in Beers v. Pusey, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that:
Anyone who owns an undivided portion of a common treasure is guardian and protector of the entire fortune .... A tenancy in common is

like a tapestry with multiple owners. No one can remove or add to his
own individual share of threads. Any change in the design can only be
accomplished with unanimous approval of all owners ....
Beers, 132 A.2d at 348.
14 See L. S. Sealy, FiduciaryRelationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 74 (1962) ("Indeed,
in very few cases has there been anything more than a ruling that the situation is or is
not 'fiduciary....'").
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fiduciary relationship. A recurring formulation denies the existence of fiduciary obligation between cotenants generally, except in
the flamboyant rhetorical flourishes, but goes on to acknowledge a
more limited obligation to act in good faith in a small number of
fairly narrow fact patterns.15 These fact patterns have included situations involving acquisition of an outstanding tax title 1 6 or encumbrance on the common property17 and its assertion against a
cotenant who, within a reasonable time, offers to contribute his
share of the expense of gaining the adverse title. Acquisition at the
same time by conveyance from a common grantor, or by descent
from a common ancestor, is frequently cited, albeit without explanation, in these contexts as important in imposing fiduciary obliga8
tion on cotenants.1
This Article will develop the proposition that the legal relationship existing between or among a number of people, each having the simultaneous right to control the same resource, is so
intermingled and intertwined that it deserves admission into the
fiduciary obligation family, either as a matter of sound policy or
because it bears a sufficiently close family resemblance to more
conventional categories of fiduciary relationships. The hypothesis
will then be tested against decided cases in a variety of factual contexts to determine its practical utility in predicting results of future
judicial decisions.
E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 122 (4th ed. 1991); JESSE
E. KRIER, PROPERTY 323-24 (2d ed. 1988); Moynihan, supra note
supra note 5, at 307; Allan W. Vestal, "Ask Me No Questions and I'll
Tell You Lies"' Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint
Ventures, 65 TUL. L. REv. 705, 728 (1991) ("The general pronouncements of the
courts merely set the stage for the more tightly focused holdings ...
16 See infta notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Goergen v. Maar, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956). See asoJOHN
E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIA-S ON PROPERTY 348 (1990). Professor Cribbet
suggests that
it should not be supposed that cotenants will always be regarded as having a fiduciary relationship which will prevent one from acting for himself to the possible disadvantage of another. It has been suggested that
where the cotenants acquire their interests simultaneously by the same
conveyance, or by a testate or intestate succession, the relationship
should be recognized; otherwise not - e.g., where one cotenant conveys
his undivided interest to an outsider, the latter may well be regarded as
having no fiduciary duty to the other cotenant(s).
Id.; cf ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.10, at 217 (2d ed.
1993) (footnote omitted) ("When co-tenants acquire their concurrent interests at the
same time, either by the same instrument or by inheritance from a common ancestor,
they are held to be subject to fiduciary duties with respect to their dealings with the
common property.").
15 RALPH

DUKEMINIER & JAMES
1, at 218; SHEPHERD,
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THE ABSTRACTION OF UNDIVIDED OWNERSHIP

The common law we inherited from England recognizes three
distinct forms of collective ownership:1 9 joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, and tenancy by the entireties. 2° The fundamental nature
of the joint tenancy and its essential distinguishing characteristic is
that, when one joint tenant dies, whether testate or intestate, his or
her share of the property passes to the other joint tenant(s) by
right of survivorship, or jus accrescendi.21 Tenants in common, on
the other hand, are said to own separate undivided shares of the
whole property, subject to the concurrent ownership interest of the
other(s). The respective ownership interests are undivided in the
sense that the property in which their shares subsist is undivided.2 2
In other words, each tenant has an equal right to possess and enjoy
every part of the property. 23 Conversely, no one cotenant has the
right to exclusive possession of any particular part of the property.
Unity of possession, and the abstraction of undivided or fragmented ownership, are the principal attributes and essential dynamic of the tenancy in common. 24 Each cotenant has the
theoretical right to possess and enjoy the entire property, limited
only by the concurrent exercise of that same right by other
19 By concurrent ownership it is meant that the owner of an interest in land is

entitled to possession not alone, but simultaneously in conjunction with other persons. All such persons are said to hold tide concurrently, or in co-ownership, and to
have concurrent interests. E. H. BURN, CHESHIRE AND BURN'S MODERN LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY 207 (14th ed. 1988).

20 Tenancy by the entireties and, to almost the same extent, joint tenancy, involve
spousal or other close familial relationships which attract fiduciary obligation for
other reasons and are, therefore, outside the scope of this inquiry. CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 18, § 5.10, at 217 & n.l ("The requirements for a fiduciary relationship
are, of course, always satisfied in a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy.").
A fourth form of co-ownership, coparcenary, existed in England at early common
law where land descended from the ancestor to two or more females in default of a
male heir. The estate in coparcenary was not generally recognized in this country,
and it is now obsolete as a separate form of co-ownership. MOYNIHAN, supranote 1, at
224-25.
21 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 5.3, at 199.

22 Tenants in common all occupy "promiscuously." BURN, supra note 19, at 216. If
A and B are tenants in common, A has an equal right with B to possession of the
whole land. This united right to possession is the only one of the four unities that
tenancy in common shares with joint tenancy. Unlike joint tenants, tenants in common may each hold different interests (i.e., one may be entitled to two-thirds and the

other to one-third), acquired under different titles (i.e., one may have purchased and
the other inherited his or her share), and at different times. Id.
23 Porter v. Porter, 472 So. 2d 630 (Ala. 1985); Muslow v. Gerber Energy Corp.,
697 P.2d 1269 (Kan. 1985).
24 Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Mich. 1980) (Moody, J, concurring

in the result).
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25

cotenants.
Unlike joint tenants, the undivided interests of tenants in common need not be equal fractional shares.2 6 Further, tenants in
common need not have obtained their interests at the same time
or from the same source. 27 In summary, there may be several cotenants, some having larger fractional shares than others, and having received their interests from different grantors at different
times, all having an equal right to the use and enjoyment of the
property.
Although a cotenant's interest is undivided, each cotenant
owns a separate property interest. Unlike joint tenancy, the tenancy in common carries no right of survivorship.28 When a tenant
in common dies, her interest passes through her personal representatives to her heirs. Each cotenant is free, without the permission (and notwithstanding the express objection) of the others, to
transfer her interest by deed,2 9 or by lease."
Common law rules of construction since feudal times favored
joint tenancy because operation of the right of survivorship led
eventually and inevitably to the vesting of titie to the property in a
single person.3 1 But courts of equity, in the interest of justice,
would reverse the constructional preference to favor tenancy in
common.12 The presumption that a transfer to two or more unmarried grantees creates a tenancy in common, absent expression
of the grantor's intention to the contrary, has now been codified by
statute in every American jurisdiction.3 3
Other situations exist in which more than one person owns an
interest in the same property (e.g., landlord and tenant, life tenant
and remainderman). It is the conflict between fragmentation of
25 MOYNIHAN, supra note
26 Where a deed or will

1, at 214.
does not specify the shares of each cotenant, however,
there is a presumption of equality. Caito v. United Cal. Bank, 576 P.2d 466 (Cal.
1978).
27 MOYNIHAN, supra note 1, at 214. However, the circumstances may be significant
in determining whether tenants in common are in a fiduciary relationship. See infra
notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
28 Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42 So. 2d 438 (Miss. 1949).
29 Wilk v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1947).
30 Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1953); Carr v. Deking, 765 P.2d 40
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
31 Spessard v. Spessard, 494 A.2d 701, 705 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); BURN, supra
note 19, at 209; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 5.3, at 198.
32 BURN, supra note 19, at 209 ("Equity aims at equality, a feature that is conspicuous for its absence if the survivor becomes the absolute owner of the land.").
33 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 4.02[l][a];CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 189.
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ownership and unity of possession3 4 that is unique to the tenancy
in common, and distinguishes it from other types of concurrent
ownership. Each of the cotenants has a separate and distinct interest in the common property; but the right of possession is common
to all.
A high degree of trust and loyalty underlies the reciprocal
rights of cotenants regarding possession. Each cotenant has an
equal right to possess and enjoy all or any portion of the property
as if he were the sole owner,3 5 but only because possession by one is
deemed possession by and for the benefit of all.3 6 One court has
held that the concurrent right to possession itself gives rise to fiduciary obligation.3 7
II.

His'roRic.AI DEVELOPMENT

The notion that tenants in common owe fiduciary duties was
first expressed in 1821 by New York's ChancellorJames Kent, a legendary figure in American law.3 8 Chancellor Kent held that one
tenant in common could not divest the other of property acquired
by devise from a common ancestor by acquiring an outstanding
adverse title. Rather, the purchase by one cotenant inures to their
common benefit, subject to contribution by the other to the expense of acquisition.3 9 According to Kent, "Community of interest
produces a community of duty . . .to deal candidly and benevo-.0 Notwithstanding the rhetorical
lently with each other .
breadth of the opinion, 4' Kent was careful to limit himself to the
case of two cotenants in possession under a title derived from a
34 Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 126 N.J. Eq. 366, 9 A.2d 51, 55 (1939) ("Two men cannot plow the same furrow.").
35 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 4.03[1] [b] (Arthur R. Gaudio ed. 1991).

36 Id. § 4.03[1][a].
Smith v. Borradaile, 227 P. 602, 608 (N.M. 1922).
See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
COLUM. L. Rv. 547 (1993).
39 Van Home v. Fonda, 5Johns. Ch. 388, 407 (N.Y. Ch. 1821).
37

38

40

Id. at 407-08.

41

The Chancellor stated:
It is not consistent with good faith, nor with the duty which the connec-

tion of the parties, as claimants of a common subject, created, that one
of them should be able, without the consent of the other, to buy in an
outstanding title, and appropriate the whole subject to himself, and
thus undermine and oust his companion. It would be repugnant to a
sense of refined and accurate justice. It would be immoral, because it
would be against the reciprocal obligation to do nothing to the prejudice of each other's equal claim, which the relationship of the parties,
as joint devisees, created.
Id. at 407.
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common ancestor,42 a distinction since widely adopted in this
43
context.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the House of Lords was
presented with the opportunity to follow Chancellor Kent in the
leading case Kennedy v. DeTrafford." In 1877, Carswell and Dodson, tenants in common of property in Manchester, executed a
mortgage to DeTrafford to secure a loan of£60,000. By 1886, Carswell had been adjudicated bankrupt, and Kennedy had been appointed trustee. The DeTrafford loan went into default, and, in
1889, the mortgagee exercised the power of sale. Unbeknownst to
Kennedy or Carswell, Dodson purchased the property at foreclosure for the unpaid principal balance, plus interest and costs, of
£54,000.45
In 1891, Kennedy discovered that Dodson had acquired the
property and, in 1895, sued to set aside the sale and for redemption. Finding that Dodson occupied a fiduciary relationship with
Kennedy, the vice chancellor ordered that, upon paying Dodson
his share of the amount owing, Kennedy be restored to his interest
as cotenant of the property. The vice chancellor's decision was
subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal.
Kennedy appealed the Court of Appeal decision to an unsympathetic House of Lords.4 6 Kennedy relied upon Van Home v.
Fondafor the proposition that tenants in common stand in a fiduciary relationship, but acknowledged that there was no English decision to this effect.4 7 Lord Herschell clearly was unwilling to allow
New York authority to carry the day in the House of Lords. 4' Lord
Herschell observed:
No authority has been cited in support of such a proposition.
The only authority, if it can be so called, which has been cited is
the case before Chancellor Kent; but he commences his observations by saying that he is not going to lay down a general rule
which would be applicable to such a case as this. He deals with
42

Id.

43

See infra text accompanying note 148.
1897 App. Cas. 180.

44
45

Id. at 181.

Id. at 183. Forsaking characteristic English understatement, Lord Herschell observed: "I confess I think this as hopeless an appeal as has ever been presented to
your Lordships." Id.
47 Id. at 182.
48 Id. at 190. Lord Herschell stated: "It is enough to say that even if it is to be
taken as enunciating a rule of law which would be as applicable in this country as in
America, it does not enunciate any rule of law which would be sufficient for the appellant in the present case." Id.
46
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the particular case, the circumstances of which were peculiar
and of immense complication, and he certainly does not lay
down any rule or doctrine of law which supports
the argument
49
which has been addressed to your Lordships.
The English courts revisited the fiduciary duty of tenants in common six years later.5" A landlord named Stone leased property in
Westminster to John Biss for seven years for use as a lodging house.
At the expiration of the term, Stone refused to renew the lease, but
allowed Biss to remain as a periodic tenant from year to year at an
increased rent. Biss died intestate, survived by his widow, two adult
children by his first wife, and an infant child. The widow, as administratrix, and the two adult children continued to operate the house as
before. Each of them applied unsuccessfully to Stone for renewal of
the lease for the benefit of the estate. Finally, Stone agreed to grant a
new three-year lease "personally" to the son.5 1 The administratrix
filed suit seeking to have the lease declared to be held by the son for
the benefit of the estate. Believing himself bound by long-standing
precedent, 52 the trial judge reluctantly granted her application.5 3
The Court of Appeal reversed.5 4 Only after the landlord's absolute refusal to deal with the estate,5 5 and full opportunity for the
49
50

Id. at 189-90.
In reBiss, [1903] 2 Ch. 40.

51

Id. at 42.

In Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726), a trustee had renewed for himself a valuable lease held as part of the trust corpus after the landlord had refused to
renew the lease in the name of the trust because of the sole beneficiary's infancy.
Holding that a fiduciary may not take the renewal of a lease which he holds on behalf
of another, Lord Chancellor King ordered that the lease be held on constructive trust
for the beneficiary.
In Ex parte Grace, 90 Rev. Rep. 917 (C.P. 1799), leasehold property devolved
jointly on an administratrix and her infant son. After she remarried, her new husband, Grace, acquired a renewal of the lease in his own name. The court required
Grace to hold the lease as trustee for the infant son.
53 In re Biss, [1903] 2 Ch. at 43.
54 The appellate court explained and distinguished Grace. Having married the administratrix of the deceased owner of the leasehold, Grace held the term on her behalf, subject to the same trust on which she had held the estate. Thus, Grace was in
no better position than she would have been had she herself obtained the renewal
which, under the authority of Keech v. Sandford, would not be very good. Furthermore, Grace was in possession of the property. Id. In In re Biss, the son was not a
trustee for the others, nor was he a party in possession.
55 Landlord Stone had made it abundantly clear that he would not deal with John
Biss' estate. He was aware that the son had assisted his father in the business, however, and was desirous of helping him earn a livelihood, for his father's sake. Stone
wrote as follows to the court appointed receiver for the estate:
With regard to your inquiry as to renewal of the above premises, I beg to
inform you that I positively decline any negotiations for renewal either
to Mrs. Biss or to any one representing the estate of the late Mr. John
52
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widow to attempt to procure renewal for the estate, did the son accept
a proposal made to him by the lessor.5 6 Under these circumstances,
the son was entitled to renew the lease for his own benefit. Not content to rest the opinion on its narrow factual context,5 7 Master of the
Rolls Collins indulged himself in the hyperbolic proposition for which
Biss would thereafter be cited: "Tenants in common do not stand in a
fiduciary relationship to each other."58
Subsequent development of English land law came through legislation. Compared with the accidental outcomes of the litigation process, legislative reform was planned and purposive. 9 As we have
seen, 60 each tenant in common owns a separate, though undivided,
interest in the common property. Accordingly, a purchaser of land
from tenants in common or a mortgage lender extending credit on
the security of tenancy in common property must obtain the concurrence of all tenants in common and investigate the status of title to
each cotenant's share. Whereas the survivorship feature of joint tenancy avoids division of tenures,6 i tenancy in common results in the
fragmentation of land into successively smaller interests. Over time,
each original share may become vested in numerous other persons.
So many separate titles could exist in the same piece of land for it to
be more expensive to investigate than the land is worth.6 2
Biss. I have already rejected Mrs. Biss' application in this connection,
and if I let the premises again it will be for the express purposes of
offering it to Mr.J. E. Biss,junior, as a matter of respect for him and his
late father; but this, of course, is entirely a matter between Mr. J. E. Biss,
junior, and myself.
Id. at 42.
56 Id. at 58.
57 Even within the context of a fiduciary relationship, a party is generally considered to be free to pursue an opportunity after the other party has had an equal
chance, or that would not be available to the other for various reasons. Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928) (dicta); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

241-42 (1986).
58 In re Biss, [1903] 2 Ch. at 57.
59 See generallyJ. STUART ANDERSON, LAWYERS AND THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAND
LAW 1832-1940 (1992). For England, the Great War "was a watershed after which
nothing was the same again." Id. at 281. The radical reform of English land law in
1925 reflected "a general post-war desire to set the nation's social life in order." Id.
60 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62 F. H. LAWRENCE & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 111 (2d ed. 1982).
The tendency of title to fragment in just two generations may be illustrated by the
following real-life example: Husband conveys to his wife, for life, remainder to his
children and their heirs. The couple had 10 children, one of whom died during the
widow's life, leaving a similar will, seven children and a widow. Upon the widow's
death, title to the property vested in the following 17 people:
Each of testator's nine living children,

or their assigns

7/70
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Intended to remedy this situation, the Law of Property Act of
1925 revolutionized the joint ownership of land.6 3 The Act abolished
the tenancy in common as a legal estate.6 4 Since 1925, a conveyance
in undivided shares to more than one person operates as if the legal
estate has been conveyed "in trust for sale" to the grantees, holding as
common law joint tenants. 65 Upon payment of the purchase price, a
purchaser of the legal estate from the trustees takes tide free of the
equitable interests of the beneficial co-owners. From the purchaser's
perspective, the interests of the beneficial co-owners are said to be
"overreached," although they have corresponding rights against the
trustees to the purchase money.66 In an ironic final analysis, after the
English judiciary rejected the concept of fiduciary duty among tenants
Each of the seven children of the deceased child,
subject to the prior life estate of their mother
1/70
BuRN,supra note 19, at 218.
63 See generallyJ.G. RIDDELL, INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAw (4th ed. 1988).
64 Id. at 153.
65 A devise to two or more persons in undivided shares operates to vest legal title
to the property in the trustees under the will or, if there are none, in the personal
representative, in trust.
In a conveyance or devise to more than four persons, the first four named in the
conveyance hold as common law joint tenants. Thus, if land is conveyed or devised in
fee simple to A, B, C, D, and E in equal shares, A, B, C, and D become joint tenants of
the legal estate as trustees for the five equitable co-owners. The equitable owners are
entitled to the rents and profits, and the proceeds of sale.
66 The following example serves to illustrate this concept:
Assume that fee simple
title to Blackacre is held by A, B, C, and D, as tenants in common. In 1990, A died
leaving all his property to his four children, E, F, G, and H. In 1992, C died intestate
leaving six children, I, J, K, L, M, and N. In 1993, D, in need of money, is offered a
fair price for Blackacre by P. "I will be happy to sell," says D, "if I can obtain the
consent of my fellow co-owners." "Who are they?" P inquires. "Well," says D, "there's
E, F, G, and H, who each own 1/16, B owns 1/4, and I,J, K, L, M, and N each own a
1/24 share." D proceeds to make contact with each cotenant except B. D's letter to B
is returned marked "Addressee Unknown". Upon further inquiry, D learns that B
died intestate in 1991, shortly after his third marriage was dissolved, leaving numerous
children and grandchildren. After months of correspondence, D learns that C's
daughter, N, died leaving her property among 14 nephews and nieces. Title to the
land by now will have become fragmented among so many persons that, even if D
could somehow trace them all and obtain their consent to the sale, P would surely
have lost interest in buying Blackacre.
Under the Law of Property Act 1925, legal title to Blackacre was vested in A, B, C,
and D, asjoint tenants on trust for sale for A, B, C, and D as tenants in common. As a
result of the operation of the joint tenancy, after the deaths of A, B, and C, legal fee
simple title vested in successively fewer people. P's investigation of title to Blackacre
will be limited to the chain of conveyances into A, B, C, and D, and the death certificates of A, B, and C. P will take a valid legal title free of the equitable interests of the
beneficial co-owners, whose interests are relegated to the purchase money. In deciding to sell the land, the trustees are obliged to consult the beneficiaries and obtain
the consent of a majority of them. If the consent of a majority was not obtained, P still
takes a valid legal title free of the beneficial co-owners, whose remedy lies in an action
against the trustees for breach of trust. RIDDELL, supra note 63, at 164-66.
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Parliament legislated the law of trusts into the

CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION TO THE FAMILY OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIPS

Something about the law of fiduciary obligation seems to impede precision of thought and clarity of expression on the part of
courts and commentators.6" The fiduciary concept is widely regarded as among the most indefinite, imprecise, and elusive legal
abstractions.6 9 The term "fiduciary" is appropriately derived from
the Latin "fiducia," meaning trust. In declaring (as opposed to analyzing) whether a relationship is a fiduciary one, courts often require the exercise of faith and trust.7 °
In judicial usage, the term "fiduciary" was adopted in the 19th
century to describe situations falling short of the well-defined relationship of trustee and beneficiary, but were regarded as similar.7 1
The category of relationships that gives rise to fiduciary duty is not
an exclusive or closed set.7 2 However, there is widespread disagreement concerning the identity of the members 73 and a shared sense
67 Hart, supra note 8, at 261-62.

68 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1991). The uncertain parentage cannot help. SeeJ. C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of FiduciayRelationship,
97 LAw Q. REv. 51 (1981) ("Fiduciary relationships are children of the forced marriage of agency law and trust law.").
69 Id. at 69, 72. See also DEMOTr, supra note 6, at 2; SHEPHERD, supra note 5, at 4;
Demott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 6, at 879.
70 J.R. Maurice Gautreau, Demystifying the FiduciaryMystique, 68 CAN. BAR REv. 1, 2
(1989) ("A legal paraleipsis has lurked about the courts when it comes to stating what
constitutes a fiduciary relationship.").
71 See, e.g., In reWest of England and South Wales District Bank, 11 Ch. D. 772, 778
(1879) ("What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong
arise, the same remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as
would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust."); DEMOrF, supra note
6, at 12.
72 Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651, 653 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[E]quity has not set
any bounds to the facts and circumstances out of which a fiduciary relationship may
arise . .. ."); Schaumann, supra note 6, at 22. Indeed, the earliest use of the term
"fiduciary" by ajudge appears to have been by Lord Chancellor Cowper in what might
be described as an "unconventional" context: suit by a landlord for an accounting of
copper ore from a mine opened and thereafter extracted by a tenant without the
landlord's consent. Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (1717)
("[T] he tenant is a sort of fiduciary to the lord, and it is a breach of the trust which the
law reposes in the tenant, for him to take away the property of the lord.").
73 Trustees, agents, partners, corporate officers, and directors appear in enumerations with sufficient regularity to be classified among the "conventional" category of
persons owing fiduciary duties. Attempts by one party seeking to recharacterize as
fiduciary an otherwise arm's length commercial relationship result in the recognition
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of mystery in English-speaking countries surrounding the criteria
for admission of new or "unconventional" members. 4 A certain
vagueness in fiduciary law may be essential to the purposes served
by the doctrine.
Courts clearly are keeping the circumstances
under which fiduciary duty arises a moving target. 76 Whether this
is inadvertent, unavoidable, or a conscious judicial shell game, is
open to debate.7 7
A high barrier for admission of new members to the fiduciary
of "unconventional" fiduciary relationships. E.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609

F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979) (franchisor/franchisee); Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Ryan, 250 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Ark. 1966) (vendor/purchaser), affd per curiam 368
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1966); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1986) (lender/borrower). But see W.K.T. Distrib. Co. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 746
F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the theory that parties to franchise relationship
owe fiduciary duty); Ritchie Enters. v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1041, 105254 (D. Kan. 1990) (refusing to impose a fiduciary duty in product liability case against
seller of computer technology based on a long-standing relationship with a customer). See also Lee A. Rau, Implied Obligationsin Franchising: Beyond Terminations, 47
Bus. LAw. 1053, 1061 (1992).
74 Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 156 C.L.R. 41, 68 (Austl.
1984) ("The authorities contain much guidance as to the duties of one who is in a
fiduciary relationship with another, but provide no comprehensive statement of the
criteria by reference to which the fiduciary relationship may be established.").
As one commentator noted:
[I]t has often seemed as if some sort of mystical invocation were
necessary to determine if the new relationship was a fiduciary relationship; and if it was, there then followed some sort of internal laying on of
hands which imposed a raft of immovable obligations and duties on to
the shoulders of the fiduciary but precisely how this happened remained a mystery.
Gautreau, supra note 70, at 2.
75 Even if it were feasible, it might not be desirable for courts to closely define the
demarcation line showing the exact transition point where a relationship that does
not attract fiduciary duty passes into one that does. Gautreau, supranote 70, at 3. See
also Hetherington, supra note 12, at 11 (footnote omitted) ("By obscuring the limits of
fiduciary obligation under moralistic rhetoric and by verbally chastising those who are
found to have violated the standard, or come close to doing so, the courts seek to
maintain the standard by discouraging marginal behavior which might or might not
violate it."); Schaumann, supra note 6, at 24 (footnote omitted) ("The concern is that
if fiduciary law were more clear, it would encourage conduct adhering to the letter of
the rule while violating its spirit.").
76 Patton v. Shelton, 40 S.W.2d 706, 712-13 (Mo. 1931) (courts deliberately avoid
defining the scope of fiduciary relationship to allow for possible new cases);
Schaumann, supra note 6, at 24.
77 One commentator compares the reluctance of our legal system to define or
confine the fiduciary relationship to the attitude of primitive people to cameras:
They believe that the fixing of a human image on paper takes away from
the human subject some of his soul ....

[W]e must also recognize that

our reluctance to a large extent results from a fear that by defining the
concept we will rob it of its dynamics and therefore its soul.
SHEPHERD, supra note 5, at 3.
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relationship bestiary may be justified by the competing values at
stake. The altruistic norm of fiduciary duty runs counter to cherished principles of rugged individualism. Indeed, the general welfare may be better promoted when all strive to advance their own
self-interest. 7" A standard of conduct allowing people engaging in
transactions in good faith to retain the fruits of their efforts encourages individual initiative and economic activity, and conforms
with the probable expectations of the parties. That a primary purpose of law is to protect weaker transactors against allegedly exploitive behavior by the stronger may not be a self-evident proposition.
There are costs to be paid for each expansion of the fiduciary
relationship family. According to one critic of the expansion of
fiduciary duty, "it is possible to interpret much of the changing
face of the law as an attempt to charge a variety of relationships
with a fiduciary character.... Standards, rather than rules, become
the norm, and resulting imprecision prompts litigation."7 9 Another warns against allowing fiduciary norms to become "over80
stretched" lest they "lose their bite."
Judicial decisions generally have sought to avoid the task of
developing a principled framework for recognition of new fiduciary relationships. 8 1 Instead, reasoning by analogy has been the
principal analytical mechanism by which fiduciary doctrine has developed through the common law.8 2 The resemblance of an arm's
length relationship to established fiduciary prototypes determines
whether fiduciary norms should apply in the new context. 83 In the
78 JESSE

H.

CHOPER ET AL.,

CASES AND

MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

95 (3d ed.

1989).
79 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SociETY

20-21 & n.* (1981). For example,

the requirement that a cotenant who wants to share in the purchase of an outstanding
adverse title by a fellow cotenant must reimburse the purchaser for his share of the
cost of acquisition within a reasonable time has spawned considerable litigation. See
infra note 146 and accompanying text.
80 See DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 6, at 497 ("If fiduciary norms are
overextended, that vitiates their force and their undergirding of commitments to act
loyally, leaving a residue of empty, albeit emphatic, rhetoric.").
81 For example, the High Court of Australia observed:
I doubt if it is fruitful to attempt to make a general statement of the
circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist.
Fiduciary relations are of different types ....

and a test which might

seem appropriate to determine whether a fiduciary relationship existed
for one purpose might be quite inappropriate for another purpose.
Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 156 C.L.R. 41, 68 (Austl. 1984).
82 See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 6, at 891 (footnote omitted) ("The
evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more powerfully that
most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation.").
83 Id.
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classic case of Meinhard v. Salmon,84 ChiefJudge (and laterJustice)
Cardozo imposed "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"8 5
as the standard of behavior governing the relationship ofjoint venturers by analogy to the relationship among members of a general
partnership.8 6 Courts considering the duties of corporate directors
reason by analogy to trustees, agents, and managing partners.8 7
Though judges may fear to tread, commentators have risen to
the challenge to define the central concept that identifies a relationship as "fiduciary." A Toronto barrister and solicitor identifies
control by one person over property of which another is the benefi88
cial owner as a principal theory underlying fiduciary relationship.
According to another observer, access in relation to assets and the
potential for abuse that results attracts fiduciary duty in order to
maintain the integrity of the relationship between the parties."s
Possession of commonly owned property by one cotenant under
this analysis would clearly evoke a fiduciary obligation not to use
that possession for purposes inimical to the relationship among the
parties.90 The opportunity presented by possession to act against
the interests of other tenants in common attracts an obligation to
act with loyalty.9 1 The confidence reposed on the cotenant in possession by those at a distance may give rise to fiduciary obligation.9"
Does the law of fiduciary obligation accommodate variations
in intensity of fiduciary relationships, perhaps with the trust requiring the most extensive duties and more limited fiduciary relationships following on a sliding scale of intensity of duty? Or is this
simply to say that the rules that define a particular fiduciary relationship are whatever is required to maintain the integrity of that
relationship? In other words, the reason fiduciary duties of trustees appear to be so much broader than those of fiduciaries in
other relationships is because of the wide variation of factual situations that tend to recur. For example, in the agency and partner84 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
85 Id. at 546.
86 In his dissent, Judge Andrews's argument also was by way of analogy. He com-

pared the relationship of joint venturers with that of tenants in common, neither of
which he considered to be fiduciary in character. Id. at 550 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
87 Frankel, supra note 6, at 805 (footnote omitted).
88 SHEPHERD, supranote 68. Professor Sealy has also identified control over property that belongs to another as giving rise to fiduciary duty. Sealy, supra note 14.
89 Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 307-10
(1989).
90 Id. at 309.
91 See id. at 310 ("A person with access is fixed with a fiduciary obligation in order

to deter mischievous conduct.").
92 Sealy, supra note 14, at 74.
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ship contexts, there is nothing comparable to the trustee's
allocation function which imposes a corresponding fiduciary duty
to treat beneficiaries fairly. Undue influence may be less of a factor in contexts other than trusts. The expansive fiduciary duties
that apply to trustees (e.g., the prohibition against self-dealing) ap93
ply because they are relevant.
Or does the concept of limited fiduciary obligation mean
something more than applying only that which is applicable to particular relationships? Does it mean, for example, that some fiduciary relationships are more comprehensive in scope than others?
The concept of qualified or limited fiduciary duty was expressed by
Lord Eldon as early as 1821. 9' The essence of the concept is that a
relationship may properly be described as "fiduciary" for some purposes, but less than all.9 5 This concept is helpful in the sense that it
eliminates the need to search quixotically for a general definition
of fiduciary relationship.9 6 The scope of fiduciary norms is context-dependent.9 7 For example, unless the terms are intrinsically
fair and reasonable, a trustee may not deal with the beneficiary
even with the beneficiary's consent. Corporate directors, on the
other hand, may engage in self-dealing if independent directors
Flannigan noted that
[t]he content of the obligation imposed in a particular case .... depends on the factual structure of the relationship .... Thejudges have
recognized these factual differences and, over time, have fashioned particular fiduciary obligations which reflect the assumed nature of the particular structures. They have taken whatever components of a
comprehensive fiduciary obligation are required and applied them
where they are relevant. The core content of the fiduciary obligation
remains the same; it is just not applicable in full to every relationship.
Flannigan, supra note 89, at 319.
94 Lord Eldon noted:
You have a trust expressed; you have a trust implied; you have relations
formed between individuals in the matters in which they deal with each
other, in which you can hardly say that one of them is a trustee and the
other a cestui que trust,and yet you cannot deny, that to some intents and
some purposes one is a cestui que trust and the other a trustee.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bli. 1, 96 (1821).
95 Sealy, supra note 14, at 81.
96 Sealy noted that
[t]he word 'fiduciary,' we find, is not definitive of a single class of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply ....
[T]he
mere statement that John is in a fiduciary relationship towards me
means no more than in some respects his position is trustee-like; it does
not warrant the inference that any particular fiduciary principle or remedy can be applied.
Id. at 73.
97 DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 6, at 477; Scott, supra note 6, at 541.
93
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approve the transaction. 8 Elsewhere in real property law, the limited fiduciary relationship concept explains the narrow scope of
the duty owed by a mortgagee to the borrower. 99 For example, a
leasehold mortgagee who renews the lease for its own account is
deemed to hold the renewal for the benefit of the borrower, subject to reimbursement for its expenditures. 0 Limited fiduciary
duty is a recurring characterization in recent decisions involving
the fiduciary duty of pension plan trustees under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act. 0 1
IV.

RESEMBLANCE OF COTENANCY TO THE FAMILY OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIPS

Under ajurisprudence of analogy from the decided to the undecided, it is necessary to compare the relationship between persons with legally protected interests in common property to
conventional fiduciary relationships to determine whether the resemblance is sufficient to support an extension of fiduciary obligation to tenants in common. Tenancy in common bears little if any
02
resemblance to the consensual fiduciary relationship of agency.'
Tenants in common generally do not agree to act for, or under the
direction or control of, one another.1 0 3 Nor does the relationship
of tenants in common resemble that among joint venturers. Tenancy in common may be involuntary and does not necessarily contemplate a sharing of joint profits. 10 4
Although the partnership relationship provides the closest analogue, there is considerable doubt that rules which are appropriate for governing ongoing commercial enterprises would
necessarily be appropriate for relationships involving passive common ownership of property. 5 Indeed, the existence of fiduciary
DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 6, at 477.
99 Boatmen's Bank v. Wilson, 833 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
100 Rushworth's Case, 2 Free. 13 (1676).
101 See, e.g., Richman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1992); United
Mine Workers 1950 Benefit Plan and Trust v. Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n Inc.,
898 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
102 Joint ownership of property as tenants in common does not create an agency
relationship. Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Mich. 1980); Masick v. City
of Schenectady, 564 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991); 20 AM.JUR. 2D,
Cotenancy andJoint Ownership§ 2 (1965). But see McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 782
F. Supp. 1548, 1559 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
104 Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F.2d 235, 240 (10th Cir. 1947).
105 For cases holding that mere community of interest in the ownership of property, such as exists between tenants in common, does not make them partners or raise
a presumption that a partnership exists, see In re Wildman, 859 F.2d 553 (7th Cir.
98
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duty among partners, and its absence from the relationship among
tenants in common, may be of the essence in distinguishing between the two forms.1 0 6
Notwithstanding the differences, the law of partnership does
offer a ready-made body of law to which reference may be made in
resolving problems that arise in the relationship among concurrent
property owners. 10 7 Fiduciary obligation is designed to effectuate
the presumed intention of parties to a relationship as to matters on
which they have not reached express agreement.1 0 8 People entering into partnership are presumed to have a general expectation
that they will treat each other fairly. As members of a partnership,
they become obligated to behave in a manner consistent with their
presumed intention. 10 9 Because the right to partition traditionally
has been regarded as automatic, 110 tenants in common who remain
together are engaged in a voluntary mutual undertaking not unlike
that of partners.
Like those of partners, the legal rights of concurrent property
owners are so intermingled and intertwined that any exercise of
rights by one co-owner has the potential to endanger or hinder
others. 1 ' Like members of a partnership, cotenants have the ability to inflict significant liability on each other. Tenants in common
are jointly and severally liable for torts committed on common
property.1 12 Because property ownership alone is sufficient to
1988); Maloney v. Pihera, 573 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Singer v. Singer, 634
P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Troy Co. v. Perry, 228 N.W.2d 169 (Wisc. 1975).
106

ALAN R.

BROMBERG

&

LARRY

E.

RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNER-

§ 2.06 (1991) ("The most important category of activities excluded by the definition of partnership is the mere co-ownership of property as distinguished from the
carrying on of a business by the co-owners.").
107 Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Economic Relation Between Cotenants, 21 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1015, 1022 (1979).
SHIP

108 WILLIAM

A.

KLEIN & JOHN C.

COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE

78 (5th ed. 1993).
109 Id. at 74.

110 See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
111 Beers v. Pusey, 132 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1957).
112 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986). The rule
that tenants in common are jointly and severally liable for torts committed on the
common property poses the unacceptable risk of virtually unlimited liability to individual owners in the condominium context, where each unit owner also owns a fractional interest in the common areas of the building as tenant in common. PAUL
GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KoRNGoLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 571 (3d ed. 1993). In
some jurisdictions the traditional common law rule has been altered by judicial decision limiting a unit owner's liability to its pro rata interest in the common elements.
See e.g., Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983). In other jurisdictions, by
amendment to state condominium statutes, plaintiff may be required to sue the unit
owners' association rather than individual unit owners. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-
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actions or
render a co-owner liable for injury to a third party,'
expose
nonpossessory
in
possession
can
omissions by a cotenant
1 14
cotenants to joint and several tort liability.
Similarly, because the category of "potentially responsible parties" includes any person who owned or operated property at which
hazardous substances were released,' 5 property ownership alone
triggers strict liability under Federal environmental law," 6 even
though an owner may not have actively participated in generating
or disposing of hazardous waste.' 7 Recent decisions raise the spectre of exposure of absentee co-owners to unlimited joint and several environmental liability, far in excess of the value of a
of nonparcotenant's interest in the common property, regardless
8
ticipation in the release of hazardous substances."
The relationship among tenants in common is characterized
by the same separation of ownership from control underlying the
fiduciary duty of corporate directors and managers to stockholders."' The fragmentation inherent in tenancy in common 2 ° and
111, 7 U.L.A. 517 (1985). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, A Comprehensive Theoy of
Condominium Tort Liability, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 877 (1987).
11 Lansky v. Goldstein, 233 S.E.2d 437, 438-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
114 Morden v. Mullins, 153 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967). Co-owners of property
are subject to the rule that imposes joint and several liability on each of a number of
persons who fail to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff, although their interests in
the property causing the harm may be unequal and, as between themselves, only one
co-owner has the burden of fulfilling the duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 878 (1977); HARPER ET AL., supra note 112, § 10.16.
On the other hand, where one cotenant has exclusive possession and control of
common property, the other may not be held liable in tort for the possessor's negligence. Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1980) (where one tenant in common had complete control over operation of drag-strip race track, other tenant in
common of property on which track was located held not liable to estate of spectator
who died from injuries sustained after being struck by fragment from steel flywheel of
racing car). Because the exclusive possessor, by consent or acquiescence of his cotenants, is not required to share the profits from a venture on the common property,
fundamental fairness would seem to dictate that he be solely responsible for liabilities
resulting from profit-making activities. Id. at 183 (Moody, J., concurring); see also Sowers v. Birkhead, 157 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
115 By its terms, the statute imposes liability on "the owner and operator" of contaminated property. However, the phrase "owner and operator" has been interpreted in
the disjunctive, based on legislative history and logic. United States v. Maryland Bank
& Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986) ("[Bly no means does Congress
always follow the rules of grammar when enacting the laws of this nation.").
116 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
117 First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 608 A.2d 1082 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992).
118 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1988).
119 Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 48 (1991).
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the further division of ownership and management give rise to a
duty owed by a party or parties in possession to deal fairly with nonpossessory cotenants.
Access itself is a valuable property right leaving nonpossessory
co-owners vulnerable. 12 1 Exposure of nonpossessory cotenants to
potentially staggering tort and environmental liability highlights
the extreme vulnerability inherent in the situation. Imposition of
characterized by vulfiduciary duty tends to arise in relationships
122
another.
to
party
one
of
nerability
It has been suggested that the family resemblance test is being
used to disguise a judicial reasoning process that more accurately
may be described as instrumental. 2 According to this view, fiduciary obligation is nothing more than a device by which the law responds to situations in which one party's discretion ought to be
controlled because of the nature of the party's relationship with
another. 124
Is it self-evident that tenants in common should behave fairly
toward one another? The answers to questions about who tenants
in common tend to be and how the relationship tends to arise supply reasons for imposing fiduciary norms on concurrent owners.
Property ownership in tenancy in common rarely arises as the considered result of thoughtful real estate planning. Grantees who
take title to real property by design tend to execute agreements
governing their relationship, thus becoming partners. In most instances, tenancy in common is thrust upon the parties, usually as
takers of a class devise or intestate disposition.' 25 Accordingly,
although they will have become opposing litigants by the time the
issue arises, tenants in common overwhelmingly start out as family
members and friends.
It is appropriate to impose fiduciary norms on co-owners if
they conform to rules that the parties themselves probably would
have chosen to govern their relationship.1 26 Utmost fairness and
120 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
121 See Singer, supra note 119, at 41 ("The freedom to use or possess limited re-

sources implies a correlative vulnerability in others.").
122 Frankel, supra note 6, at 810.
123 DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 6, at 909-10.
124 Id. at 915. DeMott added: "This instrumental description is the only general
assertion about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained." Id.
125 CHUSED, supra note 4, at 484-85.
126 Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[F]iduciary duty is a
standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if they dickered about
the subject explicitly. . .

.").

See also Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate

Revision of Uniform PartnershipAct, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 468 (1991) ("A default rule that
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good faith are implicit expectations within circles of family and
friendship, as are more expansive fiduciary norms of selflessness
and protection of the vulnerable against exploitive behavior. The
idea of wheeling and dealing behind the backs of fellow owners is
foreign to relationships governed more by the golden rule than by
the law of the jungle.12 7 "[F] orms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length"1 28 are out of context in
these circles.1 29 "Such feelings arise out of ethical notions about
how family and friends should deal with each other."13 0
Implicit expectations of family and friends are reflected in decisions enforcing fiduciary duty among tenants in common, where
title was derived from a common source at the same time. 31 Limiting fiduciary obligation to these situations excludes successor tenants in common. Though not family, and perhaps not even
friends, co-owners by succession are more than strangers, and even
more than neighbors. They own the same property, at the same
time, and in the same way. If not norms of selflessness, at least
intense cooperation would seem to be required if the parties expect to maintain a successful, continuing relationship. Imposition
of fiduciary duty tends to arise in relationships in which extremely
132
close cooperation is the norm.
TESTING HYPOTHESIS AGAINST CASE LAW

V.

Ad hoc judicial decisions in a wide variety of factual contexts
enforce expansive fiduciary norms against tenants in common, including duties of care, 133 loyalty, 1 34 cooperation, 13' and against enaccurately reflects implicit agreements tends to save people the cost of drafting agree-

ments and also tends to avoid unexpected results.").
127 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 108, at 71. But see Carr v. Deking, 765 P.2d 40
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (declaring that public policy does not prevent farm lessee from
going behind the back of one tenant in common to obtain more favorable lease from
his father).
128 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
129 RIcHARD

H.

CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY (TEACHER'S

GUIDE) 111 (1988).
130 Id.

131 See supra text accompanying note 42.
132 Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 91
(1987).

133 Montcastle v. Baird, 1988 WL 5682 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1988) (finding a
tenant in common liable for interest and penalties arising from failure to file Federal
income tax returns).
134 Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 1989) (declaring that fiduciary

duty of undivided loyalty owed by cotenants requires avoidance of conflicts of
interest).

135 Bartz v. Heringer, 322 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1982) (holding that a co-optionee, a
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richment at the expense of other cotenants1 3 6 A cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty to subordinate personal interest is
available to remedy usurpation by one cotenant of an "opportunity" properly belonging to the tenancy in common. 137 This section analyzes cases arising in recurring factual patterns to
determine whether fiduciary norms influence the judicial decisionmaking process in a predictable manner.
A.

Sharing Interests Acquired From Third Parties

New or additional rights obtained by trustees, life tenants, and
parties in possession under limited or partial interests in property
are deemed to be an accretion to the original property. 138 Parties
to fiduciary relationships are allowed no greater rights in regard to
accretions than they had in the property originally held.1 3 9 This
principle of fiduciary duty is routinely applied to tenants in
common.
1.

Tax Sale

The fiduciary relationship existing among tenants in common
gives rise to the general rule that one cotenant cannot purchase
common property for himself at a public sale to satisfy unpaid real
estate taxes 1 40 or special assessments. 41 Purchase of an outstanding tax title inures to the benefit of all cotenants. 14 2 The rationale
for this rule is that,
where the property is assessed as a whole for taxation, all the
potential cotenant, has a fiduciary duty to cooperate with fellow co-optionee in exercise of option).
136 See, e.g., Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 903 (Ark. 1992)
(finding that where a cotenant in possession paid fire insurance premiums and was
the named insured, the fiduciary relationship between tenants in common requires
that the fire insurance proceeds be held for the benefit of cotenants).
137 Moore v. Bryson, 181 S.E.2d 113 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (suggesting that the
purchase of property adjacent to common property may be regarded as having been
made for the benefit of all cotenants). But see Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield, 732
S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
138 Sealy, supra note 14, at 77.
139 Id.
140 Fuller v. McBurrows, 192 S.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ga. 1972); Smith v. Smith, 52 So.
2d 1, 7 (Miss. 1951); Bevan v. Shelton, 469 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Okla. 1970); Beers v.
Pusey, 132 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1957).
141 Woodard v. Carpenter, 195 P.2d 983, 985 (Wash. 1948).
142 Howard v. Wactor, 41 So. 2d 259, 261 (Miss. 1949) (en banc); Sperry v. Tolley,
199 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1948) (reasoning that because the purchase of a tax title
inures to the benefit of all cotenants, acquisition of a tax title by one cotenant in his
own name is not notice to the others that the purchaser claims adversely for purposes
of commencing statute of limitations on adverse possession).
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cotenants are equally in default if the tax is not paid when it is
due, and none should be permitted to cure his own default by
overdue payment, thus obtaining a "tax title," without allowing
1 43
the others to do the same by reimbursing him.
Where the land has been assessed on the tax rolls in the names of the
co-owners separately, it cannot be said that the redeeming cotenant
was in default with reference to taxes assessed against the interest of
other cotenants.14 Accordingly, the cotenant generally is free to re1 45
deem for himself the shares of delinquent cotenants.
To take advantage of this rule, nonpurchasing cotenants must of-

fer to contribute their proportionate share of the cost of acquisition
within a "reasonable" time. The point at which delay becomes unreasonable is the subject of considerable litigation.1 46 The cases are
sharply divided over whether a tenant in common is free to acquire
title to the common property from a bona fide third party tax sale
47
purchaser.'

Some authority continues to apply Chancellor Kent's distinction"' and limits the rule to tenants in common claiming under the
same instrument.' 4 9 However, the clear trend of the decided cases is
away from any distinction based upon the circumstances in which ten150
ants in common acquire title.

supra note 18, at 348.
Stoltz v. Maloney, 630 P.2d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
145 Id. at 563-64.
146 CompareBeers v. Pusey, 132 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. 1957) (delay of 12 years after wife
of one cotenant acquired title at sale of common property for unpaid taxes was not
fatal to the claim of other cotenants) and Massey v. Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176, 1181
(Utah 1983) (granting relief despite nine-year delay where cotenant purchaser did
not assert exclusive ownership) with Lund v. Henrich, 189 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. 1963)
(delay of 25 years estops cotenants from questioning tax sale purchaser's title).
147 Compare Patterson v. Wilson, 223 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1950) and Hamilton v. Shaw,
334 S.E.2d 139, 141 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (yes, on formalistic reasoning that cotenancy, by then, has ceased to exist) withAdams v. Adams, 512 So. 2d 1150, 1152-53 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (quotation omitted) ("[W]hen the common property has been
sold for taxes to a stranger, even though the time for redemption has expired, a tenant in common cannot by the purchase of such title assert it against his cotenant.");
Whelchel v. Solomon, 180 So. 2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1965); Brown v. Brothers, 97 So. 2d
642, 645 (Miss. 1957); and O'Toole v. Yunghans, 320 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Neb. 1982).
148 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g.,Jennings v. Bradfield, 454 P.2d 81, 82 (Colo. 1969) (en banc) (finding
that unless they claim under the same instrument, "tenants in common are under no
greater legal obligation to protect one another's interests than would be required of
strangers."). More significant to the result may be the facts that the interests were
separately assessed, and 24 years had elapsed before the complaining cotenant sought
relief. Id. at 81. See also Dampier v. Polk, 58 So. 2d 44, 51 (Miss. 1952); Watson v.
United Am. Bank, 588 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
150 Annotation, Right of Cotenant to Acquire and Assert Adverse Title or Interest as Against
Other Cotenants, 54 A.L.R. 874 (1928).
143 CRIBBET ET AL.,
144
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Mortgage Foreclosure

Since 1821,15 the fiduciary duty existing among tenants in
common has been held to prevent one cotenant from purchasing
an encumbrance against, or outstanding adverse claim to, common
property for his exclusive benefit. 5 2 Rather, the interest thus acquired is deemed held in trust for the benefit of other cotenants
who, within a reasonable time,' 53 offer to contribute their proportionate share of the cost of acquisition. 54 This rule applies even
where all cotenants are adults with equal opportunity to purchase
at the foreclosure sale.1 55
B.

Acquiring Interests From Each Other

We have seen that the community of ownership among tenants in common limits their right to acquire from third parties outstanding interests paramount to the common title.' 56 The
principle which prevents a cotenant from buying an outstanding
title for his own benefit does not necessarily apply to the purchase
57
by one tenant in common of the share of another cotenant.1
Construed narrowly, the fiduciary duty of tenants in common does
Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388 (N.Y. Ch. 1821).
See, e.g., Salter v. Quinn, 134 N.E.2d 749 (Mass. 1956) (where one of two cotenants purchased property at a foreclosure sale, the other cotenant had such a potential
interest in property as to render title unmarketable and to warrant refusal by contract
purchaser to the accept deed); see also Cecil v. Dollar, 218 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1949).
153 CompareSalter v. Quinn, 143 N.E.2d 749 (Mass. 1956) (delay of 17 years did not
necessarily preclude cotenant from asserting claim) and McArthur v. Dumaw, 43
N.W.2d 924, 927 (Mich. 1950) (offer to contribute made for first time in pleadings
filed two years after foreclosure and a year after redemption period expired held to
be reasonable) with Finley v. Bailey, 440 So. 2d 1019 (Ala. 1983) (claim made 35 years
after cotenant acquired property barred by laches). See also Colquhoun v. Colquhoun, 88 N.J. 558, 443 A.2d 1045 (1982).
154 Laura v. Christian, 537 P.2d 1389, 1391 (N.M. 1975) (election to contribute
held timely even though cotenant waited to offer payment until it became apparent
that exercise of option to purchase adjacent property significantly enhanced value of
subject property); Rider v. Phillips, 178 N.Y.S. 142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919); Westhoff v.
Klein, 436 N.W.2d 243, 244 (N.D. 1989); Knesek v. Muzny, 129 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1942)
(applying rule to purchase of outstanding mortgage by spouse of cotenant); Jolley v.
Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). But see Givens v. Givens, 387 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1965) (no duty to hold for cotenants where party acquired outstanding interest
before cotenancy relationship arose).
155 In Starkweather v. Jenner,the Supreme Court refused to apply the rule to a public
sale of the common property. However, the plaintiff had delayed at least four years in
claiming against the cotenant purchaser, during which time there had been substantial appreciation in value. Starkweather, 216 U.S. 524, 531 (1909).
156 Colby v. Colby, 79 A.2d 343 (N.H. 1951); see also Annotation, supra note 150, at
906.
157 Sharples Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 167 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1946).
151

152
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not extend to the acquisition of an interest adverse only to the undivided interest of another cotenant. 158 Rather, cotenants are free
to buy from or sell to each other in good faith. 59
In Bissell v. Foss, 6 ' the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity
to adopt an expansive interpretation of the fiduciary duty of tenants in common. Hunter, Bissell, Foss, and persons called "the
Missourians," were co-owners of a mine in Colorado. The Missourians wanted to sell their undivided interest in the mine. Bissell and
Foss agreed that they should try to buy the Missourians' interest for
the benefit of Bissell, Foss, and Hunter. 16 ' After this attempt failed
for pecuniary reasons, Foss and Hunter purchased the interest of
the Missourians, with Hunter providing most of the $15,000
purchase price.162 Relying on the rule that one cotenant cannot
purchase an outstanding title or encumbrance for his own benefit,
Bissell filed suit to participate in the acquisition. The Court held
that Hunter and Foss, constrained only by the morals of the marketplace, were free to purchase for themselves the interest of some
of their cotenants without consulting or including Bissell. 6
In an arm's length real estate transaction, when information
has not been requested, neither party owes the other a duty to disclose material facts that the other party could have discovered by its
own due diligence.' 6 4 Although this rule has experienced consid158 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 93 (1965) (footnote omitted)
("[Olne cotenant can purchase the share of another just as he would buy property
from a stranger .... "). The authority cited to support this proposition, McMahon v.
McMahon, involved an inter-familial dispute between octogenarian litigants in which

plaintiff waited 14 years to complain of a cotenant's alleged fraud. McMahon v. McMahon, 157 So. 2d 494, 498 (Miss. 1963).
159 Ziebarth v. Donaldson, 185 N.W. 377, 378 (Minn. 1921) ("[I]n such transactions
they deal as adverse parties."); Colby, 79 A.2d at 344.
160 114 U.S. 252 (1885).
161 Id. at 257.
162 Id. at 255.
163 By reason of his prior understanding with Bissell, Foss had an obligation to in-

form Bissell of the failure of their plan before making another with a third person.
The Court added:
But it was not a legal obligation capable of enforcement inforo externo,
but only a natural obligation to be disposed of in foro conscientiae... It
was one of those obligations which was binding on the honor and con-

science of the party, but one not the subject of a suit and not to be
enforced in a court of either law or equity.
Id. at 262.
164 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps,
Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Strangers transact in markets all the time

using private information that might be called 'material' and, unless one has a duty to
disclose, both may keep their counsel."); Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp.
1551 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Ray v. Montgomery, 399 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 1980); Kruse v. Bank
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erable (and well-deserved) erosion in recent years in the case of
sellers of residential real property,1 65 it remains alive and well with
regard to buyers. 166 Thus, prospective purchasers are under no
duty to disclose facts or opportunities within their knowledge materially affecting value of the property.1 6 7 To summarize, at least in
the case of purchasers, silence may not be golden, but at least it
does not constitute actionable fraud. Such is the state of the law in
the absence of a fiduciary relationship.
The existence of a fiduciary relationship changes everything.
The duty to render complete information is a hallmark of any fiduciary relationship.16 This aspect of fiduciary obligation is more extensive than the mere duty to supply information upon demand. 6 9
The duty includes a self-executing obligation to make affirmative
disclosure even in the absence of explicit request for information.1 70 In a fiduciary relationship, nondisclosure of material fact is
of America, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043
(1989). The rationale for limiting liability for failure to disclose is that information is
a valuable commodity and its production would be discouraged if the producer must
share it with the whole world. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 445 (citation omitted) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]n inventor is not required to blurt out his secrets, and a skilled investor is not required to disclose the results of his research and insights before he is able
to profit from them.").
165 A line of cases now imposes a duty on sellers to disclose defects or conditions
known to the seller which substantially affect the value or habitability of the property,
the existence of which are unknown to the purchaser and unlikely to be disclosed by a
reasonably diligent inspection. Failure to disclose gives rise to a cause of action in tort
in favor of purchaser. Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (dicta);
Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982); Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green
Farm Assocs. Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 392 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). But see Stambovsky v. Ackley,
572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (limiting disclosure duty to situations in which
the condition was created by vendor, and limiting relief to rescission).
166 Zaschak v. Traverse Corp., 333 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (purchaser
with graduate degree in geology, and aware of oil and gas exploration in area, had no
duty to disclose his knowledge to seller); Harrell v. Powell, 106 S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1958)
(dicta) (no duty to disclose purchaser's knowledge of gold mine on land).
167 Annotation, Duty of Purchaser of Real Property to Disclose to the Vendor Facts or Prospects Affecting the Value of the Property, 56 A.L.R. 429 (1928).
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 173 (1957). Ordinarily, a party may be expected to gain whatever knowledge he desires before buying or selling property by making diligent inquiry and examination. A relationship of trust and confidence may tend to lull even a reasonably
prudent party into omitting a full investigation. Accordingly, a duty to volunteer material information arises from the expectation of the parties that they will be open and
honest in their dealings with one another. Even if the parties have no such actual
expectation, fiduciary duty doctrine has the effect of imposing it. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 106, § 6.06.
169 HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WiLiAM A. GREGORY, THE LAw OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 189 (2d ed. 1990); Leona Bean, The FiduciaryRelationship of a Partner,5J.
CORP. L. 483, 491-92 (1980).
170 BROMBERG

& RIBSTEIN, supra note 106, § 6.06.
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actionable fraud. 1 7 1 Breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure will
72
preclude suit for specific performance.
Does their relationship require tenants in common to communicate knowledge of facts affecting price or value when dealing
with each other?17 Consider the situation where the purchaser
has already received an offer from a third party for the property.
An arm's length purchaser would seem to be under no obligation
to disclose this material information to the seller.'17 Because of the
fiduciary relationship among tenants in common, withholding in7
formation of an actual offer for resale is grounds for rescission.'
Although Prosser cites one early decision for the proposition that
tenants in common are under no duty to make disclosure, 1 76 recent authority subjects transfers of interests between them to espe77
cially close scrutiny to guard against fraud or overreaching.
The need for close scrutiny, combined with a stubborn insistence on limiting the scope of the fiduciary duty of cotenants, can
17
lead to some tortured analysis. In McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co.,'
disgruntled sellers of tenancy in common interests in farmland
filed suit against their purchaser for fraudulent non-disclosure of
171 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding that
the purchaser of stock in a closely-held corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the seller
to disclose existing arrangement for sale of assets to a third party at a substantial
profit).
172 Bovy v. Graham, Cohen & Wampold, 564 P.2d 1175 (Wash. CL App. 1977).
173 Dean Clark has proposed a method of analysis for determining the proper
scope of affirmative disclosure duties based on the notion of why fraud is wrong. Optimal resource allocation and impact on transaction costs underlie the objection to
fraud. The cheapest and likeliest sources of relevant information owe a duty to disclose information to others in the interest of making markets more perfect. Misrepresentation and concealment will lead market participants to wasteful investment in
costly procedures for obtaining and verifying information. CLARK, supra note 57, at
150-54. This view would seem to support imposing fiduciary duties of disclosure on
tenants in common in their transactions inter se, at least on tenants in common in
possession.
174 Annotation, supra note 167, at 446.
175 Dolan v. Cummings, 102 N.Y.S. 91, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907) (Gaynor, J., concurring), aft'd, 86 N.E. 1123 (N.Y. 1908); see also Schneider v. Brenner, 235 N.Y.S. 55, 58
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929).
176 Phillips v. Homestake Consol. Placer Mines Co., 273 P. 657, 658 (Nev. 1929) (in
connection with the sale of interest in a mining lease, cotenant was not required to
disclose the knowledge of the extraction of gold from the leased premises); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 738 n.38 (5th ed.
1984).
177 See, e.g., Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350 (Okla. 1988) (observing that by describing the "advantages" to a tenant in common of the execution of
assignment, cotenant became obligated to make full disclosure of facts); 1 AMERCMAN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 35, § 4.03[1][b].
178 782 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
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knowledge that the property contained a large mineral deposit.1 79
Ownership was fragmented among twenty-two family members,
mostly uneducated1 80 and living out of state, some of whom owned
as little as a 1/160 share. One of the cotenants, Tommy Smith,
resided on and farmed the property. He took an active role in the
negotiations leading to the sale to Georgia Kaolin. The others
trusted Smith's judgment and assumed the land was being sold as
farmland.'
Nor were the others aware that Smith would be com18 2
purchaser for his services in facilitating the sale.
the
by
pensated
In addition, the purchaser agreed that Smith would be allowed to
remain on the property for life or for eight years, whichever came
sooner. 183
Acknowledging the general rule that a purchaser has no duty
to disclose to a vendor facts which the purchaser knows affect the
value of the property, the court considered whether a duty of disclosure arose from a fiduciary relationship. Plaintiffs offered an
intriguing theory based upon Georgia Kaolin's acquisition of the
interests of the various selling cotenants sequentially over a sixmonth period. From and after the first closing, plaintiffs argued,
Georgia Kaolin became a 1/160th tenant in common with the
others and, accordingly, assumed a duty to disclose its information
about the property to them.
The court rejected this argument finding that Georgia Kaolin
stood solely in the posture of purchaser throughout the transaction. The fact that the purchaser happened to acquire one cotenant's interest before the other cotenants', did not impose a duty
upon Georgia Kaolin to disclose information. Also, the theory
seemed particularly unfair to the unlucky first seller, whose claim
would have to be sacrificed for the sake of the others'."'
Plaintiffs offered a second theory: As lessee of Tommy Smith's
mineral rights in the property since 1948, Georgia Kaolin was itself
a tenant in common with all sellers (except Smith), by reason of
The property was rich in kaolin, a valuable clay used for coating paper.
180 Id. at 1552. The opinion makes pointed reference on two occasions to evidence
of a Georgia Kaolin internal memorandum describing how ownership of the property
was divided among "'a large number of negroe [sic] heirs.'" Id. at 1560 (quotation
omitted).
181 Id. at 1556. Georgia Kaolin had become aware of the kaolin deposit because of
its status since 1948 as lessee of Tommy Smith's mineral rights in the property. Id. at
1554. Among the cotenants, only Tommy Smith was aware that Georgia Kaolin had
been drilling on the property. Id. at 1553.
182 Id. at 1556-57.
183 Id. at 1554.
184 Id. at 1562.
179
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their simultaneous possession of mineral rights in the property.
Forced to confront squarely the question of the existence and
scope of the fiduciary relationship among tenants in common, the
court concluded that it did not encompass a purchase by one cotenant of the interests of others. 81 5
Plaintiffs' third and final theory was that, while occupying a
fiduciary relationship with them, Smith was acting simultaneously
as agent for Georgia Kaolin. If so, then Smith's fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs would be imputed to Georgia Kaolin through
Smith's agency. The court agreed that ajury could find that Georgia Kaolin owed a duty to disclose its knowledge of the mineral
deposit to sellers. For the proposition that Smith stood in a fiduciary relationship with sellers, the court relied on the tenancy in
common among them (established under the same instrument
and by the same event, i.e., the will and death of their common
ancestor).1 8 6 Ironically, after first rejecting the concept that a duty
to disclose material facts arises from the fiduciary relationship
among cotenants, the court ultimately arrived in the same place
and for much the same reason.
C.

Adverse Possession

A party claiming title by adverse possession is generally required to establish open and notorious possession sufficient to
charge the owner with constructive notice of the possessor's claim.
The fiduciary relationship existing among tenants in common underlies the requirement of a higher standard for adverse possession.' 8 7 Because of their mutuality of interest,' 8 8 possession by one
cotenant of the common property is presumed to be for the benefit of all. 189 A tenant in common claiming by adverse possession
185

Id.

Id. at 1562. The court added:
Furthermore, it is the general rule that one cotenant can purchase the
interest of another cotenant as if he were buying property from a stranger.... Thus, defendant, even though it was a cotenant with the other
Smith heirs... was free to purchase the interests of its fellow cotenants
as if it were participating in a typical real estate transaction, in which a
purchaser has no duty to disclose.

186

Id. at 1564.

187

1
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(1989); Comment,
L. REv. 776, 793-94

Adverse Possession Against Tenants in Common in Tennessee, 37 TENN.
(1970).
188 Nichols v. Gaddis and McLaurin, Inc., 75 So. 2d 625, 627 (Miss. 1954), overruled
in part by Quates v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1970).
189 Simons v. Tancre, 321 N.W.2d 495, 498 (N.D. 1982).
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can only overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence1 90 of actual knowledge of the adverse possession by the cotenant out of possession.1 9 1
D. Accounting
The fiduciary relationship existing among tenants in common
underlies the availability of an equitable action for accounting by
one cotenant to enforce the fiduciary obligations of other co-owners to pay their respective portions of basic maintenance expenses
(including taxes, insurance, and mortgage debt service) or to share
rents paid by third parties with respect to commonly owned property. 92 By analogy to actions by a beneficiary against a trustee, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until termination of the
relationship.193
E.

Partition

The availability of partition as the remedy of choice for disgruntled tenants in common may explain the judicial reluctance to
enforce expansive fiduciary duties in the co-ownership context.
Courts may be interpreting "the absence of legislative regulation of
co-ownership as an affirmative policy of nonintervention. Indeed,
the courts' attitude towards co-ownership could best be described
by the adage if you don't like it, get out of it (by partitioning it.)".' 9 4
The common law right of partition available to tenants in common has long been regarded as absolute and unconditional.1 9 5
The availability of partition is said not to yield to hardship, inconvenience, or injury to others, 19 6 nor is it influenced by the motivation of the party seeking partition.' 9 7 Recent holdings suggest that
190 Bayless v. Alexander, 245 So. 2d 17, 20 (Miss. 1971).
191 City of Honolulu v. Bennett, 552 P.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Haw. 1976); Kennedy v.
Bryant, 252 So. 2d 784, 788 (Miss. 1971); 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 2556
(1979).
192 Howell v. Bach, 580 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Hafeman v. Gem Oil
Co., 80 N.W.2d 139, 159 (Neb. 1956); Minion v. Warner, 144 N.E. 665, 666 (N.Y.
1924); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAw 804-05 (1993).
193 Goergen v. Maar, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826, 830-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
194 Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole D. Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A
Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REv. 69, 74 (1993).
195 Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116 (1892); Saulsberry v. Nichols, No. CA 91-289,
1992 Ark. App. LEXIS 76 (Feb. 5, 1992); Cheeks v. Herrington, 523 So. 2d 1033 (Miss.
1988).
196 Heldt v. Heldt, 193 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. 1963); 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 9, § 1822.
197 Davis v. Davis, 262 N.E.2d 788, 790 (111. App. Ct. 1970).
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partition may not be granted as a matter of right in all cases, 19s and
will not be available where rights of other cotenants would be defeated or curtailed if partition were allowed.' 99
While partition by public sale seems fair on its face, one party
will always be in a relatively stronger position to bid on the property. Some limitation on the right to partition would afford a measure of protection of the reliance interest on continuation of the
relationship by the more vulnerable party when the more powerful
party seeks to end the relationship. ° ° For example, a single-family
house will not be readily capable of physical partition. Rather than
forcing a party in residence to vacate after a failed relationship, the
possessor might be allowed to take the entire property upon compensating the other with owelty.2 01 Because partition is the dissolution of the relationship, perhaps it is not surprising to see an
absolute rule on the theory that fiduciary duty evaporates when the
relationship is in the process of being dissolved.
CONCLUSION

The concept of limited fiduciary obligation appears to explain
the jurisprudence regarding the nature of the relationship existing
among a number of people, each having the simultaneous right to
control the same resource. At its essence, limited fiduciary obligation means that some aspects of the relationship give rise to fiduciary constraints, while other aspects of the same relationship do not.
In other words, parties may be subject to fiduciary constraints in
relation to particular matters or spheres (as to which they undertake to act for and on behalf of the interests of others and not their
own), but remain free to act solely by reference to their own selfinterest in relation to matters outside the ambit of the fiduciary
relationship.2 "2
Tenants in common are required to act in a representative
character with regard to the sharing of interests acquired from
third parties. They are constrained by fiduciary duties of loyalty
Baker v. Drabik, 224 N.J. Super. 603, 541 A.2d 229, 231 (App. Div. 1988).
199 See, e.g., Redick v. Jackson, No. CIV-89-0363202-S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 49
(Jan. 7, 1991).
198

200 Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 614, 750

(1988). Professor Singer argues that, when relationships of mutual dependence end,
a redistribution of property rights among the parties may be necessary to protect the
legitimate interests of more vulnerable persons. Id. at 699.
201 Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565 (D.N.J. 1986).
202 Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 156 C.L.R 41, 99 (Austl.
1984) (Mason, J., dissenting) ("That contractual and fiduciary relationships may coexist between the same parties has never been doubted.").
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and cooperation in regard to adverse possession, accounting, and
certain other matters. However, the tenancy in common jurisprudence does not enforce an expansive moral obligation to ensure
that commonly owned property be used for the mutual benefit of
all co-owners. In the disposition of interests in the common property to third parties and inter se, cotenants stand in an arm's length
contractual relationship.

